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1. Introduction 
The observation that governments have a proclivity toward growth has attract­
ed growing attention on the part of economists. Due in part to recent growth 
in budget deficits, tax burdens and public expenditures, researchers have for­
warded many proposals for better controlling government size. These include 
balanced budget rules, fiscal decentralization, privatization and tax reduc­
tion. 1 All of these proposals have been promoted as controls over public 
sector size. 
This paper argues that tax reduction is an effective means of reducing gov­
ernment size. Three reasons are presented in support of tax reduction. First, 
tax reduction, ceteris paribus, unambiguously lowers the ability of govern­
ments to spend. Second, tax reduction offers a tangible quid pro quo effect 
that compensates citizens for benefits lost from spending reduction. Three, 
given our political process, tax reduction carries a relatively high likelihood of 
success at reducing government size. While we acknowledge that simultaneous 
reduction in tax revenues and net debt issue is theoretically superior to a policy 
of only lowering tax revenues, the former is argued to be an unacceptable 
choice within the current political environment. 
2. Budget constraint facing government 
Effective control of government size requires control over funding levels. The 
current ability of government to spend is 
B=T+D (1) 
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where T = tax revenue and D = net debt issue. Tax revenue refers to legislated 
taxes and, as described in Friedman (1971), taxes derived from inflation. Net 
debt issue is the current period's net addition to the national debt. The sum of 
T and D represents the government's budget constraint. 
This model is developed in more detail in Marlow (1987) and follows ideas 
previously elaborated in Friedman (1972, 1978). Assuming that government 
decisionmakers prefer more spending to less, the government maximizes its 
use of both tax revenue and net debt issue. All methods of finance satisfy the 
spending desires of public spenders and, consequently, the level in (1) 
represents an optimal combination of funding level and mix. For example, 
government decisionmakers may be constrained by relative tolerance limits 
that taxpayers place on each form of finance. If taxpayers lower their toler­
ance for deficit finance relative to tax finance, government decisionmakers 
will alter the funding mix and level toward tax finance and away from deficit 
finance. While this model does not determine the optimal level and mixes of 
finance, it demonstrates the importance of the government's budget con­
straint in the process of government growth. 2 
Government decisionmakers determine their optimal funding level in (1) 
and set expenditures E 
E=T+D (2) 
so that government consumes all available resources and shows no propensity 
toward surpluses. Some empirical support for this assumption of causality 
running from funding levels to expenditures is found in Manage and Marlow 
(1986), Blackley (1986) and Marlow and Manage (1987).3 Under this causal 
assumption, policy changes that lower (raise) the actual funding level in (1) 
also lower (raise) government spending. Clearly, tax reduction and balanced 
budget legislation which serves to lower net debt issue are candidates for lower­
ing the budget constraint of government. These policies lower the 'allowance' 
of government and allow fewer spending opportunities. 
A policy of complete control over spending is one that controls legislated tax 
revenues, forces a balanced budget and forbids the Central Bank to inflate. 
Such policy is identical to policy that sets a maximum allowable size of 
government since both sides of (1) are identical. Such a policy framework 
greatly lessens the importance of the funding mix when proposing policy ac­
tions to lower the size of government. However, public policy discussions 
avoid addressing the issue of government size so clearly, simply and bluntly. 
Instead, programs are evaluated on a piecemeal basis for signs of merit and 
questions concerning the appropriate size of government are often co-mingled 
with discussions of deficit reduction and tax increases. Very rarely do analysts 
make reducing government size the ultimate policy objective.4 
We suggest that, as long as policy discussion avoids the issue of setting max­
imum constraints on government size, policy should seek second-best propo­
sals that control a subset of funding parameters. That is, with discussion not 
focused on the LHS of (2), proposals must deal with a subset of the policy 
parameters on the RHS of (2), if we are to control government size. 
Equation (1) demonstrates that tax revenues and net debt issue are the two 
candidates for controlling the public funding level. 5 Three arguments suggest 
that control of tax revenue offers greater control over government size than 
policies aimed at net debt issue.6 One, as cited above, there exists some empir­
ical support for the hypothesis that tax increases, ceteris paribus, lead to larger 
government expenditures. The converse is, of course, that tax reduction, 
ceteris paribus, leads to smaller expenditures. The causal empirical nature of 
this relation suggests that changes in tax revenue are not negated by simultane­
ous changes in net debt issue of the opposite direction.? That is, when taxes 
are increased, reductions in net debt issue do not occur to such an extent so as 
to wash out the pro-spending effects of tax increases. The empirical evidence 
suggests that either net debt issue reinforces the pro-spending effects or under­
goes a relatively small decrease in size. 
Two, in terms of sheer magnitude, tax revenue constitutes a majority of the 
total funding level and future tax revenue - whether legislated or derived from 
inflationary policies - must ultimately payoff current rising net debt issue 
burdens. In terms of the U.S. government's total funding level in 1986, approx­
imately 78070 of total expenditures were funded by tax revenue. 
Three, in the current political environment, balanced budget rules appear to 
offer two choices: spending reduction and tax increases. If balanced budget 
rules encourage the political response of raising taxes, such rules appear to en­
courage changes in the budget constraint that are in the direction opposite as 
that required to lower government expenditures. Ifbalanced budget rules cause 
taxes to rise, politicians are tempted to use these resources to make up for the 
negative stream of utility associated with higher taxes. Moreover, as is clear 
from (2), the political response of raising taxes is identical to a response that 
mutes the spending-reducing effects of balanced budget rules. Combined with 
the empirical evidence suggesting a positive causal link running from tax reve­
nue to public expenditures, these arguments suggest that balanced budget laws 
may promote government spending via the political response of tax increases. 8 
Problems associated with making the deficit the ultimate policy objective 
are shown in Figure 1. Iso-expenditure lines for politicians are shown for 
differing combinations of taxes and deficits. Here, we assume that tax in­
creases are utilized to produce deficit reduction. The initial position is A, with 
To taxes and Do deficits along iso-expenditure line EoEo- Assume that taxes 
are raised to T I. If deficit reduction is 'incomplete' - that is, .1T > .1D ­




such as B. We may expect deficit reduction to be incomplete due to the positive 
wealth-income effect generated by higher taxes for politicians and the tenden­
cy to deflect the negative utility stream generated by the higher taxes on voters 
by placating blocs of special interests with more spending. The message is that 
prime focus on deficit reduction may backfire since it will likely lead to higher 
taxes and, since the political spending constraint is enlarged, the dynamics are 
set for greater, not less, public spending. 
3. Fiscal illusion complexities 
While tax reduction induces important budget constraint effects that exert 
anti-spending influences, some argue that there may also be an associated 
'false' substitution effect with a pro-spending influence. This 'fiscal illusion' 
effect is a major reason for why Buchanan and Wagner (1977) argue for a 
balanced budget amendment as the ultimate means of controlling government 
size.9 The fiscal illusion argument is that, dollar per dollar, taxes hurt taxpay­
ers more than deficits. Accordingly, policies that trade-off tax reduction for 
higher deficits lower the perceived price of public spending, even though the 
true resource cost of a given level of government spending remains the same. 
Fiscal illusion theorists maintain that deficit finance and monetary debase­
ment associated with filling the void left by tax reduction is continually dis­
counted by the public and, as a perverse consequence, tax reduction makes it 
appear that public spending is now cheaper thus leading the public to increase 
their quantity demanded of public spending. Interestingly, this scenario sug­
gests that tax reduction leads to higher deficits and larger public sectors. 
The fiscal illusion argument presents a conclusion opposite to the one 
presented here. The important policy questions are: (1) whether or not fiscal 
illusion exists and (2) if it exists, whether or not to the pro-spending effects 
stemming from the 'false' substitution effect out-weigh the anti-spending ef­
fects stemming from the budget constraint effects of tax reduction. That is, 
even if fiscal illusion exists, the important question concerns its magnitude. If 
the level of fiscal illusion is relatively small, then the net effect of tax reduction 
may still be on the side of expenditure reduction. 
While we do not claim final answers, we suggest three reasons for why the 
complexities suggested by fiscal illusion may not dominate the anti-spending 
effects (via tax reduction) on the budget constraint. One, on the basis of the 
model presented here, in order for tax reduction to raise the level of govern­
ment spending it must also cause a greater than one-for-one increase in deficit 
finance. That is, since 
.6.E = .6.T + .6.0 (3) 
and with.6.T < °and.6.0 > 0, then 1.6.0 I > 1.6.T I in order for .6.E > 0. There­
fore, the implied assumption underlying fiscal illusion is that tax decreases 
raise the budget constraint via deficit increases. This does not appear to be a 
sustainable property. Even if there exists some latitude to substitute larger def­
icit increases for smaller tax reductions, it is difficult to suggest that govern­
ments are not increasingly constrained, after some finite point, from engaging 
in such practices. 10 This ability to fool taxpayers rests on the actual-perceived 
cost dichotomy surrounding government deficits (as perceived by taxpayers) 
and is probably not uniform over time as deficit finance increases as a percen­
tage of the total funding level. In other words, it is expected that taxpayers will 
learn, to some extent, over time and reduce the cost differential surrounding 
the actual-perceived dichotomy. The recent outcry over deficit growth may 
suggest that the degree of fiscal illusion is falling and therefore will serve to les­
sen the ability of fiscal illusion to promote spending expansion as tax revenues 
are reduced. 
Two, casual empirical evidence demonstrates that every major industrial 
country has raised tax burdens over the past twenty-five years and it does not 
appear that higher tax-prices have deterred government growth. Three, as dis­
cussed below, deficit reduction is not an effective quid pro quo with which to 
trade public spending reduction compared to tax reduction. 
4. Tax reduction and the quid pro quo 
Tax reduction carries a quid pro quo element that is similar to the notion of 
the transitional gains trap in Tullock (1975), because it is a tangible payment 
to citizens for benefits lost from spending reduction and may eventually lower 
opposition to spending reductions. Without clear retribution, citizens would 
most likely be adamantly against loss of benefits associated with public spend­
ing reductions, or, at least, be indifferent for reasons associated with rational 
ignorance. Tax reduction is analogous to Tullock's cash bribe technique ad­
vanced to reform government regulation. 
An interesting illustration of the quid pro quo effect emerges from James 
Madison's 'violence of the faction' - a reference to the process of budget ex­
pansion by special interest groups. Special interests promote expansion of 
their programs since that is where per capita benefits are largest. However, 
since the per capita costs of program expansion for each special interest are ex­
tremely small, the general public is unlikely to lobby to prevent program ex­
pansion which solely benefit special interest groups. For example, a $2 billion 
spending cut to 50,000 beneficiaries converts to a per capita loss of $4,000 to 
each program participant. In contrast, the same amount spread across the 
working population of approximately 100 million amounts to $20 per capita, 
or clearly a mere pittance in relation to annual average incomes or annual aver­
age tax burdens. Moreover, many citizens are rationally ignorant of budgetary 
issues since years of diligent study are necessary before becoming well in­
formed about the myriad of government programs. This informational barrier 
provides tremendous incentives for special interests to promote their programs. 
Choosing relatively large tax reductions may circumvent some of the hur­
dles stemming from concentrated benefits and dispersed costs. For example, 
a $40 billion dollar spending reduction translates into an average $400 gain per 
worker. Unless the per capita gain is sufficiently large, lobbying efforts of spe­
cial interests may be expected to continue to dominate the budgetary process. 
Tax reduction may also offer superior 'tangibility' properties when com­
pared to deficit reduction. We argue that it is difficult for average taxpayers 
to recognize significant connections between deficit reductions and personal 
welfare. If lower deficits are to be effective in delivering benefits to taxpayers, 
they need to be tangible. Presumably, tangibility occurs in two ways: lower in­
terest rates and smaller future debt burdens. Many problems obscure interest 
rate tangibility. Interest rates are affected by a variety of factors - the busi­
ness cycle, international movements of credit, inflationary expectations and 
money demand and supply. If it is impossible for trained observers to untangle 
these factors, it is also debatable whether interest rates are causally related to 
deficits. II Another way of transmitting the benefits of deficit reduction is 
through a smaller debt burden to future generations. However, since a sizeable 
portion of future generations are not yet old enough to vote, it requires a 
heroic assumption concerning intergenerational transfers for this factor to 
constitute an important perceived benefit for taxpayers. 
By contrast, the mechanics of tax reduction are relatively straightforward. 
A good proxy has been recent marginal tax reduction. For example, Internal 
Revenue Service (1986) estimates that a $40 billion spending reduction pack­
age could be used to reduce taxes by the same magnitude and would translate 
into a 7.5070 across-the-board reduction of personal income tax rates - enough 
to excite many taxpayers. 
Ultimately, promotion of tax reduction and realization of potential quid 
pro quo effects may change the rules of the budgetary game. 12 Tax reduc­
tion's quid pro quo element may promote taxpayer interest in spending reduc­
tion if it 'wakes' up taxpayers to the financial benefits associated with tax 
reduction. The key to the process stems from the size of the tax reduction and 
from the awareness of tax reduction possibilities - gains from trade - be­
tween taxpayers and Congress. By increasing taxpayer incentives to seek politi­
cians promoting tax reduction, the new rules of the game may weaken the rela­
tive bargaining power exercised by special interests over Congress. Moreover, 
political competition could increase if politicians realize the potential vote 
power behind candidates promoting tax reduction. Heightened competition 
may promote smaller government, as the political market for favors now in­
cludes both pro-spending special interests and anti-spending taxpayers. 
5. Conclusion 
Our paper seeks the strategy that allows the greatest ability to reduce public sec­
tor size within a political environment that does not want us to directly set 
limits on public sector size. Tax reduction, through its quid pro quo effect, 
offers high tangibility to taxpayers and may raise political power of groups 
that seek both tax reduction and greater opposition to lobbies that seek spend­
ing increases for their narrowly-defined interests. Moreover, as Manage and 
Marlow (1986) argues, since the political response to balanced budget rules is 
likely to raise taxes, this political bias of tax hikes suggests that balanced bud­
get rules are offered as a means of changing the funding mix and not the actual 
budget constraint of government. 
Our analysis should not be construed as a statement promoting deficit fi­
nance. Preferred policy is one that forces tax reduction, a balanced budget and 
price stability. However, this is 'optimal' only in a world without political con­
straints and special interests seeking public funds. Hard second-best choices, 
based on available analytical and empirical evidence, suggest that tax reduc­
tion controls the most important element of the budget constraint and that we 
should not rely solely on balanced budget rules to solve the underlying public 
sector growth problem. 13 
Notes 
1. See, for example, Buchanan and Wagner (1977), Friedman (1978) and Marlow (l988a). 
2. The model also assumes that changes in government size or growth do not affect the size of 
the economy. While conventional economics has often argued that government spending ex­
erts a positive or neutral effect on economic growth, there exists a growing literature suggest­
ing that government size and growth are negatively related to economic growth. See Orzechow­
ski and Vtt (1985), Marlow (1986) and Barth, Keleher and Russek (1987). 
3. See Anderson et aI. (1986) for evidence that fails to support the rising tax revenue-rising public 
expenditures hypothesis. Though not specifically using causality tests, von Furstenburg et aI. 
(1986) finds no evidence of taxes leading spending and some evidence finding spending leading 
taxes. For a discussion of the evidence, see Marlow (1988b). 
4. See Orzechowski and Conda (1985) for a discussion of this issue. 
5. Our discussion aggregates legislated taxes and inflation-related taxes. For a disaggregated ap­
proach, see Marlow (1987). 
6. Tollison and Wagner (1987) argue tax reduction emphasis is Hobbesian while deficits empha­
sis is consistent with the Lockean view of contractual governance. However, the authors note 
, ... despite the clear contradiction between their intellectual foundations, tax limitation can 
be supported in conjunction with support for budget balance (p. 387). 
7. Since LlE = LlT + LlD, the empirical evidence suggests that increases in Tare 1) not completely 
countered by decreases in D or 2) associated with increases in D as well. That is, when LlT > 
0, then LlE > 0 as well. 
8. A related issue is discussed in Friedman (1978: 18): 'The typical historical process is that the 
spenders put through laws which increase government spending. A deficit emerges. The fiscal 
conservatives scratch their heads and say, "My God, that's terrible; we have got to do some­
thing about that deficit." So they cooperate with the big spenders in getting taxes imposed. 
As soon as the new taxes are imposed and passed, the big spenders are off again, and then 
there is another burst in government spending and another deficit.' 
9. Some argue that the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem presented in Barro (1974) serves as an ef­
fective counter to the fiscal illusion hypothesis in Buchanan (1976), Buchanan and Wagner 
(1977) and Buchanan and Roback (1987). 
10. See Buchanan (1987) for the argument that continued rapid increases in deficits must eventu­
ally succumb to the laws of compound interest and therefore cannot continue indefinitely. 
11. See Evans (1985) for empirical evidence relating deficits. 
12. We note that, unlike the traditional assumption in public choice theory that politicians prefer 
to lower taxes and increase spending, our view is that politicians may have weak incentives to 
promote tax reduction. With our emphasis on the total budget constraint, tax reduction is tan­
tamount to voting a salary cut for politicians. Accordingly, we offer the quid pro quo effect 
as a partial counter to the natural proclivities for politicians to promote higher taxes (and 
higher spending). 
13. While we acknowledge that deficit- and inflationary-financed funding of public spending are 
very important issues, one might expect, or hope, that voter-policing of the so-called safety 
valves of the funding process is sufficient. 
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